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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NO. 14

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS CONFERENCE,
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 1948

COLOMBIA

Acting Secretary Lovett, when asked if he had information on the political connections or identity of the man whose shooting started the Bogota uprising, replied in the negative, explaining that the man had been so mutilated as to be unrecognizable. A correspondent, referring to the claim that the assassin was a Perez Conservative, asked how this tied in with the initial version of a Communist plot. Mr. Lovett replied that he had no information whatsoever about the man.

Referring to stories which said Gaitan's widow was refusing to attend the funeral if the President were going to be there on the ground that her husband had been assassinated by the Conservatives, a correspondent asked if we had any information on this. Mr. Lovett replied in the negative.

The Acting Secretary summarized the latest information the Department had received. He reported that temporary conference headquarters would be set up at a secretarial school gymnasium in Chapinero, about three miles from the center of town near the United States Embassy residence, although the Colombian Foreign Minister had announced that the Capitolio would probably be ready today.

The Acting Secretary stated that, according to the latest report the Department had received, the immediate conference agenda was to resolve the following problems regarding the Organic Pact: 1) Political powers of the Governing Board; 2) Relation of the Defense Council to the Pan American Union; 3) Financing of the Pan American Union; 4) Definition and name of the Inter-American System. He said that there was general agreement that the general problem of the recognition of European colonies in Latin America and the preservation of democracy and human rights would be initially considered by the Steering Committee of the conference and that the Economic Committee would meet today.

Mr. Lovett said he mentioned the latter with some reservation because it was our previous understanding that the economic aspects of this conference might be postponed. He said he did not know what the purpose of this meeting would be.

State Dept. review completed

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According to Mr. Lovett, the only new information the Department had received concerning the general situation in Bogota was that scattered sniping had resumed late yesterday afternoon after a calm day and appeared to be well coordinated. According to the Embassy, he said, this sniping now appeared to follow a regular schedule, during rush hours, especially in the later afternoon and continuing into the night.

Mr. Lovett told the correspondents that Medellin was calm and although the gasoline shortage was acute, banks were functioning normally, schools had re-opened, some railroad services had resumed and there had been no interruption of lights, water or telephone. He said that inability to stop the initial violence appeared to be due to the fact that the military had been sent to protect the electric and water plants and the police had been disarmed. He went on to say that 50 police had been detained because they had joined with the revolutionists. It was then said that the Leftists and Communists had held the City Hall for about four hours, naming Donato Duqueheir, mayor, and Uribe Arcila, Governor. On Saturday, the Embassy reported, this group and others, including a number of Communists had been jailed. According to the report, Louis Martel, who had been seen leading a portion of the unsuccessful attack Friday against the State House, was among those arrested.

The Acting Secretary, reporting on his telephone conversation with General Carter, said that in general there was more notable evidence of the resumption of normality in Bogota and the people seemed to be going about their business. He reported that some of the stores were opening up in the downtown area even though they were closed again when the sniping began. He said that the food situation in the suburbs was improving, explaining that we had flown in some emergency Army rations. Mr. Lovett remarked that, according to General Carter, the American personnel seemed to be in very good health and spirits.

OFF THE RECORD Mr. Lovett said that General Carter had commented on the superb job that had been done by Mr. Chaille who was in charge of communications and had mentioned particularly Assistant Secretary Armour and Mr. Daniels as holding the whole thing together downtown. END OF OFF THE RECORD.

Mr. Lovett said that our Embassy had no information concerning Gaitan's assassin, which they felt was accurate. He said that one of the papers had published an alleged picture and presumably an alleged thumb print but our Embassy had not been able to evaluate the accuracy of this information. The Embassy, said Mr. Lovett, had stated that their feeling about the whole affair did not relate to the assassination aspect of it at all but to the degree of organization and planning which came into effect at once after the incident itself.

Asked if he meant by this that the incident was evidently spontaneous, the Acting Secretary replied that the Embassy had expressed no opinion on the assassination at all and that their comment did not relate to that incident. Mr. Lovett went on to say that what happened after the incident showed all evidence of very careful planning and that the broadcasts showed that all the information put out by the radios taken by the extreme groups had started within less than an hour and was highly inflammatory. He said that there appeared to be general agreement that the basic cause of the serious nature of this entire affair was not social unrest.

Mr. Lovett, when asked if the picture and thumb print allegedly of the assassin tried to prove that he was a Conservative, replied that General Carter had not seen the article.

When questioned concerning his remark that social unrest was not thought to be the cause of the uprising, Mr. Lovett replied that he had intended to indicate that the degree to which this affair seemed to be obviously directed and coordinated showed that it was not the normal social unrest type of thing. He said that according to the Embassy the appeals had been coordinated through all of the radios, following established lines and there was evidence of some form of central direction and purpose. Asked if this might not mean that one of the causes was political unrest, Mr. Lovett replied that it might be so, but that we had no precise information here.

A correspondent, referring to the interest on the Hill in investigating the reason why the United States Intelligence group was not aware that such an incident might take place in view of the explosive situation at the time the United State Delegation arrived, asked whether we had received any information which would indicate that the explosion occurred at that time due to social unrest or other causes. Mr. Lovett replied that we knew that there had been a number of minor incidents in the nature of demonstrations but he pointed out that we had had such demonstrations in Washington. As far as he knew, said Mr. Lovett, the demonstration had been the type of manifestation reasonably to be expected.

When a correspondent mentioned that it seemed to be the belief among some Latin Americans in Washington that the cause was social unrest but that the Communists had taken advantage of it, Mr. Lovett replied that this was a fair interpretation of some of the information he had just received.

When asked if he had received any dispatches from Secretary Marshall complaining about the lack of intelligence in advance of the uprising, Mr. Lovett replied in the negative. Asked if we had any information as to whether the American Intelligence functioned or failed to function in giving warning, Mr. Lovett said he did not know. He said that as

far as he knew, there had been no indication that there was going to be an assassination or burning or sacking of Bogota. Asked if he considered all such demonstrations as Communist infiltration, the Acting Secretary declined to comment.

ITALY

Acting Secretary Lovett, when asked to comment on the flight of B-29's which left Westover Field and which dispatches said might be a show of strength either before or on election day, replied that such a conclusion was absolute nonsense. When asked if this answer could be taken to mean that there was no such intention and that the State Department would not sanction any such demonstration, Mr. Lovett said there was nothing in the story at all.

Asked if there were any possibility that that flight might cross over to Italy on its way to a base in the Middle East, the Acting Secretary answered that that was a matter for the Army, explaining that he did not know where the planes were going but that he assumed that the official statement was accurate. He said that it was an ordinary routine training flight.

A correspondent, referring to the fact that some of these routine flights down to the Middle Eastern base very often crossed Italy going over the Alps, asked if this might not be a matter of policy and if there were a possibility that there might be a routine flight across the center of the boot. Mr. Lovett declined to speculate. Asked if the State Department had perhaps dropped a hint to the military that it might be a good idea, Mr. Lovett said we had not said anything to them except to clear their routine statement to us that certain American planes were flying on a routine field mission.

Asked if the Army would have to get permission from the State Department before going on such a flight, Mr. Lovett replied in the negative, adding that they certainly would discuss it with us. When a correspondent referred to Mr. Togliatti's assertion that Mr. Lovett had given a very clear hint that the United States intended to use Sicily as an atomic base, Mr. Lovett said that there was no truth to the assertion.

TRIESTE

Acting Secretary Lovett, when asked to comment on reports from Moscow that the proposal which we made on Trieste had been rejected by the Soviet Government, said that as yet we had received no formal answer. A correspondent referring to the speculation that this move might have been related to the Italian elections, asked if there were any comment on the fact that the elections are about to follow, Mr. Lovett replied in the negative.

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PALESTINE

The Acting Secretary, when asked to comment on the NY Times story that the State Department and the Defense Department had concurred in an agreement that this Government would be willing to join with other countries to send troops to Palestine to keep order there after May 15 if a truce could be arranged between the Jews and Arabs, said he could not because he had not read the article. He said our position was one in which we felt that a truce was of crucial importance and we had evidence of other nations feeling the same way as a result of the Security Council vote. President Truman's comment, said Mr. Lovett, as well as Secretary Marshall's, was that we would naturally bear our fair share of our United Nations obligations, whatever they might be.

COSTA RICA

Mr. Lovett, when asked if he had any late information on what had happened in Costa Rica since the announcement of the cease fire order, said that, according to the wire the Department had received, the cease fire order appeared to be effective except in isolated instances where it was believed the troops involved had not been able to receive instructions to cease firing. In short, he said, there was no evidence of a deliberate breach of the order so far. Mr. Lovett said that representatives of the diplomatic corps had met with Mr. Figueres yesterday morning in Cartago and had received from him the conditions under which the opposition was willing to terminate the conflict. These conditions had been transmitted to the President, Mr. Lovett explained, but as yet there had been no word of any final decisions being reached.

Asked what the conditions were, Mr. Lovett declined to say, explaining that the conditions were under discussion and had been given to us in strict confidence.

When asked what role United States Ambassador Davis played, Mr. Lovett said that he was one of the group of the diplomatic corps representatives who participated in the negotiations.

GERMANY

A correspondent, referring to a Herald Tribune editorial regarding Berlin which said that since the situation there was so complex and ticklish the United States should demand directly of the Soviet Government an explanation of their recent activities, in other words, pass over the local commanders and act on a government level, asked for comment. Mr. Lovett said he had no comment other than to say that this Government was in closest contact with the military commander there and would follow the line which, in consultation with him, seemed to be the most appropriate to compose differences. Mr. Lovett said he was not aware of the incidents the correspondent mentioned.

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When asked if there were any plan now to handle this problem other than the way it has been handled through General Clay and his command, Mr. Lovett said General Clay naturally would have a variety of plans about which we had no information but we were in very close contact with him and would follow whatever procedure seemed to be designed to compose differences peacefully without the loss of our essential rights.

WESTERN UNION PACT

When asked to give some guidance as to how far the Department had gone in its studies on how to implement Mr. Truman's suggestion on March 17, backing up the Western Union by appropriate means. For BACKGROUND, Mr. Lovett told the correspondents that there had been no discussions on the Hill with Department officials. We had, he said, been giving the matter very careful thought through interested agencies since before March 17. As he indicated last week, Mr. Lovett said the basic thought in the President's message was that we would like to be in a position to know what the determination of the signatories was and we would do what we could to match and support that determination. END OF BACKGROUND.

OFF THE RECORD Acting Secretary Lovett explained that the problem was finding out what the facts were. He said we only had a paper which showed the intent. With the exception of the valuable assistance of Mr. Spaak, he pointed out, we had no evidence of anything other than this paper which threw everything in the future with respect to discussions. This, he said, was a valuable step forward but it was not adequate for us to firm up a final position on it.

When asked if there were requests coming in for agreements by which surplus arms would be transmitted to France or Belgium, Mr. Lovett replied in the affirmative, explaining that he knew of no decision on them as yet since they referred to surplus properties. Mr. Lovett said that these would not necessarily be tied into a Western Union pact but that it obviously would be desirable to look at the problem in an overall way. On the other hand, he continued, we could not wait for the overall decision on some of them, and we would have to deal with them in the light of conditions at the moment.

A correspondent asked if Mr. Lovett's statement that the Brussels Pact is as yet a piece of paper could be interpreted OFF THE RECORD as meaning that the signatories themselves were not quite agreed on the interpretation. The Acting Secretary said that that this was not the idea he intended to convey. He pointed out that the Brussels Pact involved two broad aspects--the economic and the military. What we wanted to know, he explained, was how these countries distinguished the economic from the military requirements in certain ways. He said

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we wanted to know if when a group of people got together with the idea of concentration or pooling things it applied economically or militarily. Mr. Lovett felt that the basic support of the proposal had been well stated by the President on March 17.

END OF OFF THE RECORD.

ERP

Acting Secretary Lovett, when asked if the Department had begun negotiating bilateral agreements under ERP, replied in the affirmative, explaining that they had started some time ago. He said that, as to the basic outline, the interim agreements he mentioned last week had been perfected as a sort of standard form. He said we departed from that standard form to meet the requirements of individual countries because obviously Austria's situation was different from that of France. He said that up to the present time there had been none definitely signed. He explained that the signing was a matter for the Administrator ultimately to decide but that these interim agreements had been basically agreed to. Mr. Lovett pointed out that there were five countries that had been given help through clause 115-C of ECA legislation which was a proviso of a proviso put in to meet this very special situation. Mr. Lovett remarked that this was a very good piece of legislation which reads:

"Notwithstanding provisions of subsection B of this Section the Administrator during the three months after the date of enactment of this Act, will perform with respect to any participating countries any functions under that title which he may determine to be essential in furtherance of the purpose of this title when such country has signified adherence to the purpose of this title and its intention to concur on agreement, etc. (2) and finds that such country has complied with applicable provisions of this sub-section and so forth and so on. It goes away down to the bottom and when it says: That, notwithstanding the provision of this sub-section, the Administrator may, through June 30, 1948, provide for the transfer of food, medical supplies, fibres, fuel, petroleum and petroleum products, fertilizers, pesticides and seeds to any country of Europe which participated in the Committee on European Economic Cooperation with which undertook pledges to the other participants therein when the Administrator determines that the transfer of any such supplies to any such country is essential in order to make it possible to carry out the purpose of this title by alleviating conditions of hunger and cold and by preventing serious economic retrogression."

When asked which five countries had been helped to date, Mr. Lovett answered Greece, Austria, Italy, France and the Netherlands.

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When asked if our shipping program for April were already prepared in the overall program, Mr. Lovett replied that this question would have to be directed to the Administrator. For BACKGROUND he said that all of the estimated schedules which had been prepared for the 30-day period and the 90-day period had been delivered to the Administrator and he would make the decision. END OF BACKGROUND

When asked if work had begun on the permanent bilateral agreements, Mr. Lovett replied that the work had been finished in the standard forms. He explained that one had to write what they were ultimately aiming at and then pull out of that essentials for the interim. He said that the long-term agreements were skeletonized contracts embracing the things in the Act itself. The interim agreements which were specially covered in 115-C and its sub-section, he said, provided for adherence. Then, he said, there was the general clause in it which further agrees to perform any and all acts through additional agreements in order to give full effect to the undertaking. These, he said, were all in the process of final clearance through the various Governmental agencies that had to deal with it. Particularly, he pointed out, they had to have the approval of the Administrator.

Lincoln White

* * *

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—APPENDIX

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tions and, in certain cases, subjected to indirect coercive methods of repatriation; and Whereas the United States has endorsed the principle that compulsion should not be used on homeless persons, victims of war and power politics; and

Whereas certain congressional legislation is designed to use immigration quotas not exhausted during the World War II for the purpose of admitting persons in accordance with the usual safeguard of immigration requirements; and

Whereas these people, many of them of Polish origin, are thoroughly imbued with democratic ideals and are opposed to totalitarianism, would make good law-abiding citizens: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts, in session assembled, recommends the passage of such legislation; and be it further

Resolved, That we pledge our fullest cooperation in this great task not only for ourselves, but for the great number of Americans of many origins whom we have the honor to represent; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Massachusetts Members of Congress, to the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, and to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.

In house of representatives, adopted March 2, 1948:

LAWRENCE R. GROVE,
Clerk.

In senate, adopted, in concurrence, March 8, 1948.

IRVING N. HAYDEN,
Clerk.

A true copy.
Attest:
[SEAL] F. W. COOK,
Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Resolutions memorializing Congress in favor of the passage of the adjusted-compensation bill as advocated by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States

Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts hereby urges the Congress of the United States to enact into law the adjusted-compensation bill as advocated by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be sent forthwith by the secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

In house of representatives, adopted March 2, 1948.

LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

In senate, adopted, in concurrence, March 8, 1948.

IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

A true copy. Attest:
[SEAL] F. W. COOK,
Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Reflections on Bogota

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. KATHARINE ST. GEORGE

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 20, 1948

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article

by Felix Morley appearing in Human Events:

REFLECTIONS ON BOGOTA

(By Felix Morley)

On February 11 of this year Human Events published an analysis of Communism in Latin America by Ralph de Toledano.

This article called attention to "the fact that a hard core of 500,000 Communists in Latin America is girding for battle with the North American way of living." It pointed out that the Communist-dominated Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL), under orders from Moscow, has concentrated its strength in key areas where most damage can be done to the United States. The areas named were Cuba and Panama, from both of which Colombia is easily accessible.

There is nothing vainglorious in recalling this contribution by Human Events 2 months ago. It is cited merely to show how easily the catastrophe which has taken place in Bogota could have been foreseen, and guarded against. Yet the various Intelligence offices of the United States Government apparently did not foresee the catastrophe. And evidently no effective measures were taken to avert the tragedy which flared out on April 9.

The Communist putsch in Bogota was tragic because of the lives lost and the senseless property damage involved. But it was also disastrous because of the humiliation suffered by American diplomacy.

After elaborate preparation, the Ninth Conference of the American Republics is solemnly opened at Bogota. The Secretary of State of the United States attends to emphasize the importance which this country attaches to the gathering. A whole retinue of advisers, experts, and specialists is sent down from the Department of State. The advertised objective is to consolidate the Latin Republics against Communist infiltration.

Then, under the very nose of General Marshall, the Communists stage a well-planned, well-organized coup. The conference is not merely broken up and its dignity irretrievably ruined. Even the official minutes of the proceedings to date are destroyed, and the whole solemn gathering reduced to a confusion which would be farcical except for the human suffering involved.

II

Undoubtedly this humiliation of General Marshall was the objective of the entire plot. The name of the American Secretary of State has become synonymous with the "Marshall plan" of "containing" communism with dollars.

Among the Latin peoples the loss of "face," of personal dignity, is almost as serious a matter as it is among the Chinese. General Marshall had already "lost face" in China. In Bogota there was opportunity to discredit him in the Latin world as well. The opportunity was seized. On April 9, a company of soldiers could have protected the conference rooms from pillage. Now all the Army of Colombia cannot put together the prestige which has been shattered.

This Machievellian stroke was obviously timed to take place on the eve of the vitally important Italian general election. The point here was to suggest to the Italian people that the policies of the United States are thoroughly unpopular in Latin America, and that only venal and sycophantic governments favor them. If the Colombians, next door to the United States, do not respect General Marshall, why should the Italians? Even to pose that question, so dramatically, is to weaken the hand of Prime Minister de Gasperi, whose whole campaign in Italy has been based on the efficacy of American support.

Secretary Marshall had announced that if the Communists win in Italy, that country

will be stricken from the role of those receiving assistance under ERP. The natural counterstroke to this was a move casting doubt on the efficacy and reliability of American assistance. Some stroke to that effect was anticipated and predicted. But our policy makers seem to have had no anticipation that it would be carried out in this hemisphere. Nevertheless, it should have been clear that one way to besmirch our role of good neighbor to Italy would be to discredit the good-neighbor policy where it has been most actively preached—in Latin America.

It is not by accident that the New York Daily Worker, official organ of the American Communist Party, concentrates on the "terrific black eye" given the Truman foreign policy by the Bogota revolt. That is the party line. That is the conclusion which Moscow wants people to draw. Again we have underestimated the subtlety of the forces which regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their drive for world dominion.

Writing in the Daily Worker of April 12, Joseph Starobin tells us the moral that Moscow wants to have drawn from the Bogota rising. "Colombia's common people," he says, "showed their anger with the semi-Fascist rulers whom Secretary Marshall nominates to chair conferences, the hated men who exploited Colombia's wealth in cooperation with Wall Street."

III

If the humiliation of the United States at Bogota could be concealed, our natural instinct would probably be to conceal it. But to laugh this one off is not possible, and fortunately it is also impossible to counteract the aftermath by calling for more airplanes, more generals, more atom bombs and more conscription of men and industry. Mobilization of brains rather than brawn is the urgent necessity posed by the Bogota episode.

Therefore, it is encouraging that the immediate reaction is a demand that the duplicating maze of intelligence services developed during the war be simplified and—if we must use the word—"streamlined." The present confusion is preposterous.

The armed services have their Intelligence departments, as is natural, and the FBI has established a solid reputation for its work in the domestic field. But, in addition, there is an incredibly complicated intelligence set-up in the Department of State. And, for the past year or more, there has been the hush-hush Central Intelligence Agency, which is charitably supposed to be coordinating all the other work of this character.

Merely to examine the intelligence set-up in the Department of State is to get an idea of the utter bureaucratic confusion which has developed. There is an Office of Intelligence Research, which incidentally has a whole separate "Division of Research for American Republics." Then there is a separate Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination. There is a separate "Division of International Security Affairs", within the Office of Special Political Affairs, and another "Division of Security and Investigations" within the Office of Controls. All these overlapping and conflicting agencies have been piled on top of the comprehensive area organization, which used to do first-class intelligence work without highfalutin names and titles.

It is not surprising to read, in a confidential report on the Department of State recently made to Congress, that:

"The Department has an overabundance of units, sections, branches, divisions and offices . . . there is a strong suspicion that much of this lengthy, detailed organization is for the purpose of increasing the number of personnel that can be awarded a title."

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IV

The intelligence work of the Department of State should either be greatly simplified or completely eliminated, for, as the Bogota episode shows, it is at present almost worthless. But in addition there should be a review of the entire noncareer service in this swollen Department. Something has been done to screen out the Communists and fellow travelers. But the number of plain simpletons, who got into the Department during the war, and stuck there, is an equally serious problem.

As an illustration of downright incompetence, I have dug from my files a copy of an interoffice memorandum prepared in the Division of Political Studies of the Department of State on December 30, 1943. It is an incredibly ill-informed prediction of Russian postwar policy, saying in part:

"The Soviet Union * * * goes no further than to insist that in eastern Europe the states may maintain complete autonomy and independence and any form of government which is not hostile to the Soviet Union. From the Czech pact, it is clear that Czechoslovakia will be permitted to maintain a democratic form of government based on her own choice of economic system. From the Italian pact, it is clear that the Soviet Union is prepared to permit even in this area any form of government except Fascist. * * *"

This palpably absurd analysis was written by a policy-making officer, who joined the Department of State during the war, and who has since received three promotions to his present \$10,000 post as division chief. It is not at all an exceptional case. But it is illustrative of the type of wishful thinking on which American postwar policy has been based.

When policy is formulated on the basis of improbabilities, it is to be expected that eventually those called in to administer will find themselves faced with impossibilities. Then, to baffled minds, war comes to appear the only way out.

As long as the American Republic confined itself to its own business, the quality of governmental personnel was not a matter of great moment. Since Government was of secondary importance, bureaucratic incompetence could be tolerated.

But if the Republic is to follow the course of empire on which it has now embarked, its foreign policy must be conducted, like that of Soviet Russia, by a trained elite. It is not enough to create a labyrinth of overlapping bureaus, and to give grandiloquent titles to earnest but immature college professors. To do so is to invite humiliations like that of Bogota.

On such invitations it is unnecessary to inscribe R. S. V. P. They will be accepted.

The Tragedy of Yalta—Stumbling Block of World Peace

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. GORDON L. McDONOUGH

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 20, 1948

Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Speaker, the concessions made at Yalta continue to be the stumbling block of world peace.

As a result of United States and Great Britain yielding to Russia on questions of postwar boundaries, the occupation of Germany, and the demand by Russia for one-half of twenty billion in reparations from Germany has upset the plans

for world peace and given Russia more than she was entitled to.

Russia also obtained more than she was entitled to from Japan and China and at the same time she has sought to take over all of western Europe she can get short of going to war to obtain.

I submit the following article from the Pathfinder which gives some additional details of Russia's advances since the close of World War II:

THE TRAGEDY OF YALTA

Three years ago this month, with hopes high, delegates of 46 nations met at San Francisco to draft a charter for peace.

But before the conference was 24 hours old, the wrangling started. As time passed one of the things that added fuel to the fire was the agreement of Yalta.

This accord, fashioned as a blueprint for peace, was drafted 3 months before the San Francisco conference. Its authors were President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin. They conferred for 8 days (February 4-11, 1945) at Yalta, Crimean Black Sea Riviera. The Big Three, the world was informed, reached general agreement on:

Poland's eastern border.

Occupying Germany.

Russia's share of German reparations.

"Free elections" in liberated countries.

The Crimea Conference was a turning point in the world's history, President Roosevelt told Congress. The world accepted it as such.

SECRETS

But at San Francisco, Molotov let the first telltale cat out of the Yalta bag which proved to be filled with concessions to Stalin.

Russia, the Yalta pact decreed, was to have 3 votes in the U. N. The extra votes went to White Russia and the Ukraine. It was like giving votes to New York and Texas.

Another Yalta by-product, disclosed at San Francisco, was the Security Council veto power. Russia has used the veto 23 times to block the will of the UN majority.

Yalta's biggest secret leaked out on the first anniversary of the Crimea accord. China, like Poland, had been sold down the river. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to recognize the "Mongolian People's Republic," a Soviet puppet state trespassing in Manchuria. They also approved joint Russian-Chinese operation of Manchurian railways, let the Russians maintain a naval base at Port Arthur and "internationalize" Dairen. These are Manchuria's best ports. This deal gave the Russians a foothold in Manchuria, which contains 70 percent of China's industrial strength.

And that wasn't all, Stalin demanded and got the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which the Japs had taken from Russia in 1904, and the Kuriles, 32 islands stretching from Japan to the Okhotsk Sea.

PRICE

This was the price paid to get Russia into the war against Japan "2 or 3 months after Germany surrendered." It was exorbitant because Russia finally entered the already-won Pacific war 6 days before the final shot was fired. It was shameful because the deal violated the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo declaration of December 1, 1943.

The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill, pledged "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." And the Cairo declaration, said Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, decreed:

"All territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."

The sellout of China was not the last of Yalta's secret deals. When the going got tough at the Moscow conference of foreign

ministers in March 1947, Molotov dug into his portfolio and pulled out a secret Yalta agreement by Roosevelt and Churchill on German reparations. They had accepted "as a basis for discussion," the Soviet suggestion that reparations from Germany total \$20,000,000,000, half to go to Russia. This whopping figure has been a big stumbling block in drafting a peace treaty for Germany.

The Yalta accord was, indeed, a turning point—in the wrong direction.

Lake Success or Lake Failure?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 20, 1948

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following article from the New York Post of April 16, 1948:

LAKE SUCCESS—OR LAKE FAILURE?—DAY OF JUDGMENT OPENS IN SHADOW AS NATIONS OF WORLD DEBATE DOOM OF JUSTICE

It is like a scene on the Day of Judgment. The time is the day after World War II, that had been fought on land, on sea, and in the air. A shadow lies over a desolate world, for already it is the twilight before the darkness of another world war that will eclipse the previous ones and may mark the end of the age of man on earth. The world with its 2,000,000,000 human beings sends emissaries from all its nations to its greatest metropolis. For a year and more they debate, and search, and argue for and against giving a little strip of land, 12 miles wide, to a stateless nation that lives there, the most ancient of them all, to be called home.

The Sun rises and goes down; the streets are filled with people; cars run on winding highways; trains speed underground; and life goes on its way. But the sand runs low in the hour glass, and the weapons of destruction are piled high, and still the conscience of the world deliberates. To give the people of the Bible their Promised Land as agreed to by 55 nations at San Remo 28 years ago? To give them, perhaps, only the part that is this side or the Jordan? Or maybe only a strip 12 miles wide?

The nations of the world send emissaries from 12 of their number to investigate on the spot and to report. The emissaries return; the nations of the world again deliberate in commissions and vote, in committees and vote, in the plenum of the Assembly and vote. Finally, they appoint emissaries of five nations to give the narrow strip of land to this most ancient people.

The nations around the Holy Land move their hands there to destroy what Israel has built; and those on the isles of "The Ten Lost Tribes" (as the English say of themselves) send arms to the aggressors to make the destruction possible; and those in the land of the Star-Spangled Banner put an embargo on arms needed by the ancient nation for the defense of its home.

The nations of the world reconvene. They are given a last chance to make good the evil which they and their fathers and their forefathers did to a homeless people, to wanderers over the face of the earth since the day they lost their home in a war of independence with Rome and through all the generations when they were persecuted for being true to their faith and to their heritage.

But the nations repent of their open-handedness. A 12-mile strip? Too much. They were too generous. Return the judg-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Executive Director	7/a	4/1
2	Deputy Director		2/1
3	Director	KRW	
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	W. L. P. (Plyleimer)	WLP	2/1/44
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☒ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☒ FILE

REMARKS: For Director's file.

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